Plase servis, voleybolda topaFile not: This is a draft. Please do not cite.
The final version of this paper is forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
\title{The Epistemology of Disagreement}
\author{Adam Carter}
\begin{document}
\maketitle
\begin{abstract}
Disagreement is ubiquitous, and we often find ourselves disagreeing with those we have reason to regard as our epistemic peers. What is the epistemological significance of such disagreement? In this paper, I survey the main positions in the literature on this question, and defend a conciliatory view. I then consider some objections to conciliatory views, and argue that such views can be refined to meet these objections.
\end{abstract}
\section{Introduction}
It is a platitude that disagreement is ubiquitous. We disagree about politics, religion, and ethics. We disagree about the best way to raise children, about the best way to invest our money, and about the best way to organize our society. And we often find ourselves disagreeing with those we have reason to regard as our epistemic peers.
What is the epistemological significance of such disagreement? Should we simply ignore the disagreement, and continue to believe what we believed before? Or should we revise our beliefs in light of the disagreement? If so, how much should we revise our beliefs?
These are the questions that will concern us in this paper. We will begin by surveying the main positions in the literature on the epistemology of disagreement. We will then defend a conciliatory view, according to which we should revise our beliefs in light of the disagreement. We will then consider some objections to conciliatory views, and argue that such views can be refined to meet these objections.
\section{The Equal Weight View}
The Equal Weight View (EWV) is a conciliatory view about the epistemology of disagreement. According to EWV, when we disagree with an epistemic peer, we should give equal weight to our own belief and the belief of our peer. More precisely, EWV holds that when we disagree with an epistemic peer, we should move our belief towards the belief of our peer by an amount that is proportional to the degree of our disagreement.
For example, suppose that you believe that the answer to some question is 7, and your epistemic peer believes that the answer to the same question is 9. According to EWV, you should move your belief towards 9 by an amount that is proportional to the degree of your disagreement. If you give equal weight to your own belief and the belief of your peer, then you should move your belief to 8.
EWV is a simple and elegant view, and it has been defended by a number of philosophers. However, it is also a controversial view, and it has been criticized on a number of grounds.
\section{The Steadfast View}
The Steadfast View (SV) is a non-conciliatory view about the epistemology of disagreement. According to SV, when we disagree with an epistemic peer, we are not required to revise our beliefs in light of the disagreement. More precisely, SV holds that when we disagree with an epistemic peer, we are permitted to continue to believe what we believed before.
SV is often motivated by the thought that we are entitled to trust our own judgment. After all, we have good reason to believe that we are reliable judges of the truth. So, when we disagree with an epistemic peer, we are entitled to trust our own judgment over the judgment of our peer.
SV is a simple and intuitive view, and it has been defended by a number of philosophers. However, it is also a controversial view, and it has been criticized on a number of grounds.
\section{The Justificationist View}
The Justificationist View (JV) is a view about the epistemology of disagreement that falls between EWV and SV. According to JV, when we disagree with an epistemic peer, we should revise our beliefs in light of the disagreement, but only if we have some reason to believe that our peer is more likely to be right than we are. More precisely, JV holds that when we disagree with an epistemic peer, we should move our belief towards the belief of our peer by an amount that is proportional to the degree of our disagreement, but only if we have some reason to believe that our peer is more likely to be right than we are.
JV is often motivated by the thought that we should be responsive to evidence. After all, if we have some reason to believe that our peer is more likely to be right than we are, then we have some evidence that our own belief is false. So, we should revise our belief in light of this evidence.
JV is a moderate view, and it has been defended by a number of philosophers. However, it is also a controversial view, and it has been criticized on a number of grounds.
\section{Defending a Conciliatory View}
In this section, I will defend a conciliatory view about the epistemology of disagreement. I will argue that when we disagree with an epistemic peer, we should revise our beliefs in light of the disagreement.
My argument for this view is based on the following premise:
(1) If we have good reason to believe that someone is an epistemic peer, then we have good reason to believe that they are as likely to be right as we are.
This premise seems plausible. After all, if we have good reason to believe that someone is an epistemic peer, then we have good reason to believe that they are as intelligent, well-informed, and rational as we are. So, we have good reason to believe that they are as likely to be right as we are.
From this premise, it follows that:
(2) If we disagree with an epistemic peer, then we have good reason to believe that we are as likely to be wrong as they are.
This conclusion is important. It means that when we disagree with an epistemic peer, we should not simply ignore the disagreement. We should take the disagreement seriously, and we should revise our beliefs in light of the disagreement.
How much should we revise our beliefs? I think that the answer to this question depends on the details of the case. In some cases, we may have good reason to believe that our peer is more likely to be right than we are. In other cases, we may have good reason to believe that we are more likely to be right than our peer. In still other cases, we may have no good reason to believe that either of us is more likely to be right than the other.
In cases where we have good reason to believe that our peer is more likely to be right than we are, we should revise our beliefs more than we would in cases where we have good reason to believe that we are more likely to be right than our peer. And in cases where we have no good reason to believe that either of us is more likely to be right than the other, we should give equal weight to our own belief and the belief of our peer.
\section{Objections to Conciliatory Views}
In this section, I will consider some objections to conciliatory views about the epistemology of disagreement. I will argue that such views can be refined to meet these objections.
\subsection{The Problem of Self-Defeat}
One objection to conciliatory views is that they are self-defeating. The objection is that if we are required to revise our beliefs in light of disagreement, then we will eventually end up with no beliefs at all.
To see why this is a problem, suppose that you start out with a belief that $p$. Then you discover that an epistemic peer believes that not-$p$. According to a conciliatory view, you should revise your belief in light of this disagreement. So, you should move your belief towards not-$p$.
But now suppose that you discover that another epistemic peer believes that $p$. According to a conciliatory view, you should revise your belief in light of this disagreement. So, you should move your belief back towards $p$.
If you continue to encounter disagreements of this sort, then you will eventually end up with no belief at all. You will simply oscillate back and forth between $p$ and not-$p$.
This is a problem for conciliatory views because it means that they are self-defeating. If we follow the advice of conciliatory views, then we will eventually end up with no beliefs at all.
\subsection{The Problem of Independence}
Another objection to conciliatory views is that they violate the principle of independence. The principle of independence says that our beliefs should be based on our own evidence, and not on the beliefs of others.
The objection is that if we are required to revise our beliefs in light of disagreement, then we are violating the principle of independence. We are basing our beliefs on the beliefs of others, rather than on our own evidence.
This is a problem for conciliatory views because it means that they are epistemically irresponsible. If we follow the advice of conciliatory views, then we will be basing our beliefs on the beliefs of others, rather than on our own evidence.
\subsection{The Problem of Expertise}
A third objection to conciliatory views is that they fail to account for the role of expertise. The objection is that if we are required to give equal weight to our own belief and the belief of an epistemic peer, then we are failing to take into account the fact that some people are more expert than others.
For example, suppose that you are a doctor, and you disagree with a patient about the best way to treat their illness. According to a conciliatory view, you should give equal weight to your own belief and the belief of your patient. But this seems wrong. As a doctor, you have more expertise than your patient. So, you should give more weight to your own belief.
This is a problem for conciliatory views because it means that they are unable to account for the role of expertise. If we follow the advice of conciliatory views, then we will be failing to take into account the fact that some people are more expert than others.
\section{Refining Conciliatory Views}
In this section, I will argue that conciliatory views can be refined to meet the objections that were raised in the previous section.
\subsection{Responding to the Problem of Self-Defeat}
The problem of self-defeat can be met by refining conciliatory views to allow for a certain amount of steadfastness. The idea is that we should revise our beliefs in light of disagreement, but only up to a point. Once we have revised our beliefs to a certain extent, we should stop revising our beliefs, and we should stick with our current beliefs.
This refinement allows us to avoid the problem of self-defeat because it prevents us from oscillating back and forth between $p$ and not-$p$. Once we have revised our beliefs to a certain extent, we will stop revising our beliefs, and we will stick with our current beliefs.
\subsection{Responding to the Problem of Independence}
The problem of independence can be met by refining conciliatory views to allow for a certain amount of independence. The idea is that we should revise our beliefs in light of disagreement, but only if we have some reason to believe that our peer is more likely to be right than we are. If we have no reason to believe that our peer is more likely to be right than we are, then we should stick with our own beliefs.
This refinement allows us to avoid the problem of independence because it ensures that our beliefs are based on our own evidence, and not on the beliefs of others. We will only revise our beliefs in light of disagreement if we have some reason to believe that our peer is more likely to be right than we are.
\subsection{Responding to the Problem of Expertise}
The problem of expertise can be met by refining conciliatory views to allow for a certain amount of deference to expertise. The idea is that we should revise our beliefs in light of disagreement, but only if we have some reason to believe that our peer is as expert as we are. If we have reason to believe that our peer is less expert than we are, then we should give more weight to our own belief.
This refinement allows us to avoid the problem of expertise because it ensures that we take into account the fact that some people are more expert than others. We will only revise our beliefs in light of disagreement if we have some reason to believe that our peer is as expert as we are.
\section{Conclusion}
In this paper, we have surveyed the main positions in the literature on the epistemology of disagreement. We have defended a conciliatory view, according to which we should revise our beliefs in light of the disagreement. We have then considered some objections to conciliatory views, and argued that such views can be refined to meet these objections.
I have argued that a conciliatory view is the most plausible view about the epistemology of disagreement. This is because it is the view that is most responsive to the evidence. When we disagree with an epistemic peer, we have good reason to believe that we are as likely to be wrong as they are. So, we should revise our beliefs in light of the disagreement.
Of course, this is not to say that we should always revise our beliefs in light of disagreement. In some cases, we may have good reason to believe that our peer is more likely to be right than we are. In other cases, we may have good reason to believe that we are more likely to be right than our peer. In still other cases, we may have no good reason to believe that either of us is more likely to be right than the other.
In cases where we have good reason to believe that our peer is more likely to be right than we are, we should revise our beliefs more than we would in cases where we have good reason to believe that we are more likely to be right than our peer. And in cases where we have no good reason to believe that either of us is more likely to be right than the other, we should give equal weight to our own belief and the belief of our peer.
By following these guidelines, we can ensure that our beliefs are as accurate as possible. And that is what epistemology is all about.
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